International financial 'non-system' としての「インフレ目標体制」

●Andrew K. Rose, “Are international financial crises a relic of the past? Inflation targeting as a monetary vaccine”（VOX, 31 May 2007）

Inflation targeters let their exchange rates float, usually without controls on capital flows and often without intervention. Because the goal of monetary policy is aligned with national interests, inflation targeting seems remarkably durable, especially by way of contrast with the alternatives. No country has ever been forced to abandon an inflation-targeting regime. But the domestic focus of inflation targeting does not seem to have observable international costs. As research discussed in this Policy Insight shows, countries that target inflation experience lower exchange rate volatility and fewer “sudden stops” of capital flows than their counterparts.

As a result of its manifest success, inflation targeting has continued to spread; it now includes a number of developing countries as well as a large chunk of the OECD. The system of domestically-oriented monetary policy with floating exchange rates and capital mobility was not formally planned. It does not have a central role for the United States, gold, or the International Monetary Fund. Neither exchange rates nor capital flows are controlled. In short, it is the diametric opposite of the post-war system; Bretton Woods, reversed, if you will.

●Andrew K. Rose, “Are International Financial Crises a Barbarous Relic? Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Vaccine（pdf）”（CEPR Policy Insight, No. 1, June 2007）

Much about the new system's attractiveness can be seen by tracing out the history of its emergence. The Bretton Woods regime was deliberately planned, the outcome of a long series of wartime negotiations among eminent economists representing the interests of critical countries, especially the UK and the US. This is in stark contrast with the evolutionary development of the BWR system. Countries that adopt inflation targeting do not agree to join an internationally recognised monetary system and do not accept‘rules of the game’, either implicitly or explicitly. Rather, the system has grown in a more Darwinian style, simply because of its manifest success. Also, international cooperation is not a key part of the emerging international monetary system. This is another difference with the Bretton Woods system, which required massive international cooperation to function (as do many modern attempts to reshape the international financial architecture). Accordingly, some of the key institutions of the Bretton Woods system are now essentially irrelevant. The International Monetary Fund has evolved into a crisis manager for developing countries (often those suffering speculative attacks on their fixed exchange rate regimes) and plays no real role in the new system. There is no special role for a centre or anchor country (the United States during Bretton Woods; Germany for the European Monetary System), so there is no hegemonic title to fight over. Gold is irrelevant. It may be for these reasons that developing countries are participating more quickly and fully in the system than they did under Bretton Woods. The key players are each nation's central bank, with these now more independent, accountable and transparent than they were under Bretton Woods.

●Andrew K. Rose, “A stable international monetary system emerges: Inflation targeting is Bretton Woods, reversed”（Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol.26(5), September 2007, pp.663-681, ドラフト（pdf））

●Ilian Mihov and Andrew K. Rose, “Is Old Money Better than New? Duration and Monetary Regimes”（Economics, April 24, 2008）