インタゲのすすめ
●Frederic Mishkin, “In praise of an explicit number for inflation”(FT.com, January 11, 2009)
Adopting an explicit, numerical inflation objective is exactly what is needed right now to help the US economy to recover.
The usual argument for establishing a transparent and credible commitment to a specific numerical inflation objective is that it provides a firm anchor for long-run inflation expectations, thereby directly contributing to the objective of low and stable inflation. Adoption of an explicit, numerical inflation objective has been successful in other countries in keeping inflation from going too high. However, not as well recognised is that an inflation target can help prevent inflation from falling too low. At this critical juncture that benefit can have enormous value.
How would adopting an explicit numerical inflation objective help? First, a commitment by the Federal Reserve to keep the inflation rate near an explicit objective, say 2 per cent, over a longer-term horizon would provide more incentives for the Fed – both because it would want to stick to its word and because it would subject it to more public scrutiny – to make monetary policy sufficiently expansionary in the future. Research has shown a lack of such commitment was one reason why unconventional monetary policy actions such as quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan were ineffective to promote economic recovery.
Second, when the financial system starts to recover, to keep future inflation under control the Federal Reserve will need to drain the massive amounts of liquidity it has pushed into the financial system during the past year and a half. A commitment to an explicit numerical inflation objective would encourage the Fed to explain to the public how this liquidity will be removed and subject the Fed to public pressure if it was not taking the necessary steps to make this happen.
Critics of inflation targeting fear adoption of an explicit numerical inflation objective might lead to too little focus on stabilising economic activity. Experience with central banks that have adopted explicit numerical inflation objectives shows that to do so still leaves plenty of flexibility to react to economic downturns. (That is why the term “inflation targeting” is somewhat of a misnomer because it does not mean the central bank should try to hit the target over a fixed horizon.) In addition, an explicit numerical inflation objective by the Federal Reserve would be adopted only if it was consistent with the dual mandate specified by past Congressional legislation of both price stability and stability of economic activity.
Economist's View経由。
デフレ回避のための手段としてFedは明示的に2%のインフレ目標を掲げよ、ですってよ。 あれ? インタゲってインフレの抑制にのみ有効な手段(あるいはインフレの行き過ぎを防止することを目的として採用される政策手段)じゃなかったでしたっけ?